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A PATH THROUGH THE MAZE:
DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE
TREATMENT UNDER TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
AFTER BEAZER AND BURDINEt
HANNAH ARTERIAN FURNISH *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recognized two distinct types of prima facie viola-
tions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:' disparate impact' and
disparate treatment. 3 In a disparate impact case the plaintiff attempts to
demonstrate that a neutral rule, fair on its face and objectively applied, has a
significantly greater effect on persons protected under Title VII than on the
majority group.' In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff attempts to
demonstrate that he is the victim of intentional, but covert, discrimination. 5
Theoretically, in a disparate impact case the intent of the defendant is irrele-
vant; in a disparate treatment case it is critical. 6
Since the Supreme Court's early recognition of the two types of Title VII
violations, the Court has failed to clarify several major elements of each case.
Most noticeably lacking are articulations of: (1) the relationship between the
evidentiary burdens and orders of proof imposed on Title VII litigants, and (2)
the relationship between the substantive defenses in each case. The latter prob-
lem is compounded by the Court's failure to describe adequately the defenses in
either case. Critics assert that the Supreme Court's analysis of disparate impact
and disparate treatment cases violates the principles underlying Title VII.' In
their view, the Court is revolutionizing Title VII on an ad hoc basis without
attempting to explicate a theory to support its decisions. 8 This article suggests
t Copyright © 1982 by Boston College Law School.
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law; B.A., Elmira
College, 1970; J.D., University of Iowa, 1973.
42 U.S.C. S 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
▪ See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973). Of
course, a prima facie case also may be established by showing overt discrimination. In such cases
the defendant admits discrimination but offers a statutorily sanctioned excuse. See, e.g., Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1977).
▪ See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 429.
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 801 (1973).
fi International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
7 See, e.g., Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Friedman]; Note,
Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA, L. Rtiv. 376 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Business Necessity].
8 Friedman, supra note 7, at 56; Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7, at 420-21.
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that no such revolution is occurring, but rather that the Court's opinions repre-
sent an evolution toward an explicable merger of disparate impact and
disparate treatment cases.
This article, through an analysis of the relationship between disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment cases, explores the theory that recent Supreme
Court decisions foreshadow an ultimate merger of the two types of cases. First,
the article examines the development of similar orders of proof in both cases.
Next, the substantive defenses to Title VII claims are explored. The recent
Supreme Court cases of New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 9 and Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine" are analyzed in light of their support
for the proposition that the defendant's burden in disparate impact cases is
diminishing" and thereby merging with that of the disparate treatment defend-
ant. The Court's tendency to blur distinctions between the two defenses is also
examined. Finally, while presenting a viable analytic framework which
distinguishes the two types of cases, the article suggests a theory and structure
for the eventual merger of disparate impact and disparate treatment cases.
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT — THEIR
RELATIONSHIP IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
There are relatively few Supreme Court decisions bearing directly on the
orders of proof and the substance of defenses in disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases." In order to simplify the analysis and resolution of the prob-
lems raised by these decisions this article will first analyze the relationship be-
tween the orders of proof in disparate treatment and disparate impact cases."
The more challenging problem of the relationship of the defenses will then be
analyzed.' 4
 This attempt to separate the relationship issues into distinct com-
partments is somewhat artificial and is not adhered to rigidly, but is necessary
for purposes of clarity.
9 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
1 ° 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
' 1 For an interesting pre-Burdine article containing analysis of this issue see Note,
Business Necessity, supra note 7.
12
 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981); New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979); Board of Trustees of Keene State Col-
lege v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
575-80 (1978); Dothard.v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
800-07 (1973); Griggs V. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971).
" See text and notes at notes 15-51 infra.
14 See text and notes at notes 52-182 infra.
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A. Relationship Between the Orders of Proof in Disparate
Treatment and Disparate Impact cases
The Supreme Court gave its judicial blessing to the disparate impact
method of proving a violation of Title VII in its seminal Title VII opinion,
Griggs v. Duke Power Company.' 5 In Griggs the plaintiff showed that the neutral
policies of the employer had a disproportionate impact on blacks by eliminating
significantly more blacks than whites from jobs.' 6 In the Court's view, this
demonstration of disproportionate impact sufficed to require the defendant to
show that the practice was related to job perforrnanee. 17 In analyzing the
defendant's case, the Court sought to determine whether the credentials bore
"a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which
[they were] used." s Under Griggs, then, the defendant in a Title VII case must
bear the burden of proof once the plaintiff shows disparate impact. There was
no suggestion in Griggs that the plaintiff would have a further opportunity for
rebuttal after the defendant demonstrated job-relatedness.
Two years after Griggs, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 19 the Court
described the allocation of burdens when the plaintiff claims intentional but
covert discrimination. 20 The Court first described the plaintiff's initial burden
of proof. In order to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a [protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 21
' 5 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The employment credentials challenged in Griggs were high
school diplomas and intelligence tests. Id. at 425-26. The Court found that such criteria
perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination. Id. at 430. Disparate impact may also result from
the application of a rule to the work force after it has been selected. See, e. g. , Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1977),
While Griggs was a credentials case involving criteria which perptuatcd the effects of
past discrimination, the disparate impact theory has not been limited to such cases. See, e. g. ,
Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R, Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1295 (8th Cir. 1975) (use of conviction records
may have disparate impact on blacks); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490,
493-94 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (garnishment rule may have disparate impact on blacks).
401 U.S. at 430 & n.6.
' 7 Id. at 431.
' 13 Id. For an analysis of the development of this "business necessity" or "job-
relatedness" standard by the Supreme Court see text and notes at notes 60.126 infra.
I' 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Id. at 802, 804,
at 802.
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Although the Court noted in McDonnell Douglas, 22 as well as in subsequent deci-
sions, 23 that the stated requirements are not rigid and, indeed, may be adapted
to suit various cases, they nonetheless remain valid today. 24
Once a plaintiff has established a prim facie case, an inference of inten-
tional discrimination is deemed to exist. 25 In order to overcome the plaintiff's
prima facie case, McDonnell Douglas requires the defendant to "articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 26 In con-
trast to the Griggs decision McDonnell Douglas affords the discriminatory treat-
ment plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the defendant's case. To do so the plain-
tiff must show that the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" was a "pretext
or [was] discriminatory in its application. "27
 That is, the plaintiff may rebut by
showing the employer's reason is a mask to cover intentional discrimination.
Although the McDonnell Douglas opinion did not lucidly articulate the distinc-
tions between disparate impact and disparate treatment cases per se, the Court
did recognize the existence of such distinctions. 28
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody," a disparate impact case decided in 1975,
the Court began paralleling the orders of proof in disparate impact and
disparate treatment cases. In Albemarle, the Court stated that the plaintiff in a
disparate impact case also has the opportunity to rebut the employer's
defenses." In a case involving discriminatory testing or selection criteria, this
rebuttal consists of showing that a substitute device would accomplish the
employer's job-related purpose with a less discriminatory impact on the pro-
tected class. 3 ' The Albemarle Court stated that such a demonstration would be
evidence that the employer was using its criterion merely as a pretext for inten-
tional discrimination. 32 The Court cited McDonnell Douglas in support of both
the plaintiff's opportunity to rebut the defendant's case and the stated effect of
the rebuttal evidence — viz . , to show pretext."
22 Id. at 802 n.13.
23 See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1092 n.5
(1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-77 (1978); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S 324, 358-60 (1977).
24 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 1094, n.6.
25 Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-77. The Court made clear in Bur-
dine that this inference was the equivalent of a presumption of intent to discriminate. 101 S. Ct. at
1094 & n.7.
2 '5 411 U.S. at 802.
27 Id. at 806.
For example, the Court in a footnote distinguished McDonnell Douglas from cases
where credentials standards have an "exclusionary effect" on minorities. Id. at 802 n.14. Later
in the opinion the Court described the substance of the plaintiff's claim for relief as providing the
distinction between McDonnell Douglas and Griggs. Id. at 805-06.
29 422 U.S 405 (1975).
3° Id. at 428.
" Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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The Albemarle decision provides an interface between disparate treatment
and disparate impact cases. The Court has- adopted parallel orders of proof by
allowing the plaintiff in both cases to have the final opportunity to rebut the
defendant's claims by showing that the defendant intentionally discriminated.
The Albemarle Court failed to explain, however, why proof that the defendant's
challenged practice was a pretext for intentional discrimination is relevant in a
discriminatory impact case, where — unlike a discriminatory treatment case —
the intent of the defendant is not at issue. It could be argued that the existence
of an intent to discriminate is always pertinent in a Title VII discrimination
case. Accordingly, the disparate impact plaintiff should have an opportunity to
bring intent into issue by showing the existence of lesser-impacting methods of
accomplishing the employer's acceptable purpose. The Albemarle decision was
silent, however, on the availability of other methods of showing pretext in
disparate impact cases. Absent an explanation by the Court, placing a rebuttal
burden on the plaintiff may be either an attempt to create consistency between
the orders of proof in disparate treatment and disparate impact cases or a
reflection of the Court's view that the distinctions between the two types of
cases are not as great as their underlying theories suggest."
The parallel orders of proof established in Albemarle were perpetuated by
the Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 35 another disparate impact case. The Dothard
opinion repeated Albemarle's statement that proof of lesser-impacting alter-
natives which accomplish the defendant's purpose rebut the defense of job-
relatedness. 36 Like Albemarle, the Dothard opinion gave no explanation of why
lesser-impacting alternatives are relevant in a disparate impact case or why it is
logical to place that burden on the plaintiff. Unlike Albemarle, however, the
Dothard opinion did not state that the lesser-impacting alternatives are relevant
because they tend to show pretext. The absence of reference to pretext in
Dothard may have been a sign that the Court was consciously perpetuating the
disparate impact/disparate treatment dichotomy by avoiding the issue of in-
tent. Absent a contrary statement by the Court, proof of the existence of lesser-
impacting alternatives need not necessarily raise the issue of the employer's in-
tent. For instance, the existence of such an alternative might suggest that the
use of the disputed criterion by the defendant is less necessary than alleged,
3* It is notable that a burden of demonstrating the absence of lesser-impacting alter-
natives was placed on the defendant by many lower federal courts, a fact that was not analyzed
by the Court in Albemarle or in any subsequent decision. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R.
Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798-800 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Sec also Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7, at 397-99; Com-
ment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
911, 920 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Business Necessity Defense].
" 433 U.S 321 (1977).
46 Id. .at 329.
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thereby undercutting the disparate impact defense without putting the defend-
ant's intent in issue. Whatever the implications of such a showing, the Dothard
Court's imposition of the rebuttal burden preserved the consistency of the
orders of proof between disparate impact and disparate treatment cases.
In contrast to Dothard, the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in New York City
Transit Authority v. Beazer 37
 clearly established discriminatory intent as an ele-
ment of the plaintiff's rebuttal in a disparate impact case." The Title VII
issues in Beazer came before the Court in a peculiar context." The case was
originally decided by the district court on the theory of a constitutional viola-
tion.'" It was under Title VII, however, that the district court later awarded at-
torney's fees." The court based the award on its finding that the defendant's
practices were in violation of Title VII. 42
 The court of appeals found that the
statutory issues had been preempted and affirmed the constitutional analysis."
The Supreme Court, compelled to review the statutory issue before reaching
the constitutional question, found that even if the plaintiff had established a
prima facie case of disparate impact, 44
 such a case was overcome by the defend-
ant's job-relatedness defense. 45
 The Court apparently assumed that the
disparate impact plaintiff would have an opportunity to rebut the defendant's
case.° To the plaintiff in Beazer, however, such an opportunity was meaning-
less since the issue of intent was decided by the district court in favor of the
defendant in the context of the constitutional claim." Since there was an ex-
press finding that "the rule was not motivated by racial animus," 4s the plain-
tiff could not successfully claim that the rule "was merely a pretext for inten-
tional discrimination. "49
The Beazer decision clearly injected the issue of intentional discrimination
into disparate impact cases. No mention was made of the relevance of lesser-
impacting alternatives, which seemed to be the rebuttal method prescribed in
Dothard and Albemarle." The decision thus leaves little room to argue that the
imposition of a rebuttal burden only serves to give the plaintiff an opportunity
to undercut the defense of job-relatedness, without raising the issue of intent."
" 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
39 Id. at 587.
39
 For a more extensive discussion of the Beazer case see text and notes at notes 91-126,
infra.
4° 399 F. Sup. 1032, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
4 ' 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
42 Id. at 278.
" 558 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1977).
" The Court was not persuaded by the statistical proof of disparate impact offered. 440
U.S. at 584-87.
43 Id. at 587.
46 Id.
.47 Id.
49 Id.
49 Id.
5° See text and notes at notes 29-36 supra.
" A similar conclusion is reached in Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7, at 418.
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Under Beazer, it appears that the inability of the plaintiff to prove discrimina-
tory intent effectively precludes the possibility of rebutting job-relatedness
defense. Although the Court apparently assumed intent would be the only
issue on rebuttal, it was once again silent on the question of why intent was at
issue at all in a discriminatory impact case.
In both disparate impact cases and disparate treatment cases, then, the
plaintiff shoulders a burden of rebuttal. The existence of the rebuttal burden
(or opportunity, depending upon the party's perspective) in disparate impact
cases parallels the rebuttal burden in disparate treatment cases. That the
orders of proof are parallel is not startling; it may be logical to have such uni-
formity. Uniformity is especially warranted if plaintiffs allege both disparate
impact and disparate treatment. The more critical relation between the two
types of cases, however, is to be found in the substance of the rebuttal. In both
disparate treatment and disparate impact cases the plaintiff's rebuttal must
focus on the issue of the defendant's intent to discriminate. A focus on the
defendant's intent is logical in disparate treatment cases, where intent is the
central issue. Its importance in disparate impact cases has yet to be articulated
by the Court. Perhaps, as stated earlier, the opportunity to show intentional
discrimination should always be available to a Title VII claimant. Whatever
the reason behind the Court's decision, its articulation of the rebuttal oppor-
tunity's existence is the first and least complicated link between disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment cases. Such a link suggests that, in the Court's
view, the distinctions between the cases are not intransigent. Furthermore, as
the proceeding analysis will demonstrate, just as the Court has established
similar orders of proof in disparate impact and treatment cases, so too has it
begun to establish similar substantive burdens of proof in both cases.
B. Relationship Between Substantive Defenses in Disparate Treatment
and Disparate Impact Cases
Crucial to any analysis of the relationship between disparate impact and
disparate treatment cases are the respective burdens of proof imposed upon
Title VII defendants. The burdens on the defendant have been labelled as the
defense of "business necessity" in disparate impact cases," and "articulating
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason" in disparate treatment cases."
Careful analysis of recent Supreme Court opinions suggests that decisions in
disparate treatment cases have an effect on the defendant's burden in disparate
impact cases. These issues will be analyzed in the following order: first, the
Court's treatment of the defendant's burden in disparate impact cases will be
52 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 5 1.5(d), at 53 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN, ZIMMER
& RICHARDS].
53 Id., S 1.2, at 7.
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shown; 54
 then, the evolution of the defendant's burden in disparate treatment
cases will be discussed;" finally, the implications of the relationship between
the substantive defenses in both types of cases will be analyzed."
1. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Defendant's Burden in
Disparate Impact Cases — A Diminution of the Defendant's Responsibility
The startling thing about Supreme Court decisions that describe the
defendant's burden in disparate impact cases is how little substance they con-
tain." Lower federal court interpretations of the sketchy language in Supreme
Court opinions have resulted in a rigorous burden being imposed on the
defendants." In the Court's view, however, the defendant's burden in dis-
parate impact cases is less demanding than some lower court opinions" would
suggest.
In Griggs a. Duke Power Co. the Court used both the terms "business
necessity" 6° and "related to job performance" 6 ' (job-relatedness) in referring
to the defendant's burden. It has been suggested that the job-relatedness stand-
ard is more demanding than the standard of business necessity. 62
 Business
necessity might justify criteria unrelated to job performance. 65 It has also been
suggested that business necessity is a broader-based concept which can be ap-
plied when the scrutinized criterion is a business policy of general ap-
plicability. 64
 In contrast, job-relatedness is a narrower concept which applies in
testing cases. 65
As described in Griggs a. Duke Power Co. 66
 the defendant's burden is to
demonstrate that the allegedly discriminatory selection criteria are a "rea-
sonable measure of job performance. "67
 The phrase "business necessity" ap-
peared in Griggs, but the reference was in a paragraph that linked the concept
to a showing of job-relatedness." What the defendant must show to demon-
54 See text and notes at notes 57-126 infra.
" See text and notes at notes 127-162 infra.
56 See text and notes at notes 164-182 infra.
" Other commentators have noted the Court's failure to define specifically the defense
in disparate impact cases. SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra, note 52, at 53-55.
58 See Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7, at 386-400, and Comment, Business Necessity
Defense, supra note 34, at 918-20, 933.34, for an analysis of the lower court development of the
business necessity defense.
59 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
'° See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431.
" Id.
62 See SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, § 1.5(d), at 54.
" Id.
64 Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7, at 388-89.
65 Id.
66 401 U.S. 424.
67 Id. at 436.
66
 Id. at 431. For analysis of the possible distinction between "job-related" and
"business necessity" standards, see SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, $ 1.5(d), at
54; Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7 at 387-91.
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strate job-relatedness may be gleaned from the Court's statements that Duke
Power's failure to study the relationship of the criteria it used to actual job per-
formance was fatal to its defense." According to Griggs, the burden is on the
employer to show "that any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to
the employment in question." 7 ° In Griggs, then, the burden placed on the
defendant was that of proving to the Court's satisfaction that the requirement
did in fact substantially relate to job performance.n The defense of business
necessity has grown from use in the testing and selection criteria context of
Griggs to application in all disparate impact cases." While the lower courts
were charting more particular standards for the defense," post-Griggs Supreme
Court decisions instead charted an uncertain course through the seas of
business necessity.
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 74 the next disparate impact case faced by
the Court, required greater analysis of the method by which the defendant can
attempt to demonstrate a correlation between test results and job performance
in order to establish a job-relatedness defense. 75 The defendant in Albemarle at-
tempted to demonstrate that the tests were in fact a reasonable measure of job
performance. 76 The Court applied the job-relatedness standard of Griggs" and
ruled that the company's use of slipshod methods of test validation did not
demonstrate a sufficient correlation with job performance to constitute a Title
VII defense. 78 It would be reasonable to expect that a Court so rigorous in
demanding proof of job-relatedness in testing cases 75 would be equally rigorous
in other disparate impact cases. In fact, however, the Court has never again
dealt so explicitly with the substance of the defendant's burden in disparate im-
pact cases.
In its 1977 decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 8° the Court recited the Griggs
language that the defendant has the "burden of showing that any given re-
quirement [has] ... a manifest relationship to the employment in question. "81
In a footnote, however, the Court stated that "a discriminatory employment
practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to
survive a Title VII challenge. "82 This footnote suggests that something more
69 401 U.S. at 431.
7° Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
7 ' Id.
72 See note 58 supra.
73 Id.
74 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
.79 Id. at 425-36.
76 Id. at 429-30.
77 Id. at 425.
" Id. at 431-35.
79 The Court in Albemarle ratified the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 1607.1-1607.18
(1981), relating to employment test validation studies. 422 U.S. at 430-31. The Court applied the
guidelines to the validation study in Albemarle and detailed the various ways in which the study
was "materially defective." Id. at 431-36.
8° 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
81 Id, at 329 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
82 433 U.S. at 331 n.14.
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than mere job-relatedness must be shown by the defendant before his burden is
met. The Court in Dothard found that the burden was not met because the
employer had failed to introduce evidence directly correlating the challenged
criteria (minimum height and weight) with job performance." The opinion
clearly stated that the defendant's burden is to establish this correlation be-
tween the criteria and job performance and, in the Court's view, the record fell
far short of the requisite demonstration." Justice Rehnquist's concurrence was
more restrained and suggested instead that a mere articulation of a job-related
reason should be sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case."
The distinction between the standard delineated by the Dothard majority
and that propounded by Justice Rehnquist's concurrence is noteworthy. There
is a significant difference between establishing a correlation between a chal-
lenged practice and job performance by an offer of proof, and merely asserting
that such a correlation exists. Although more than a bare assertion in the com-
plaint might be necessary to establish the defendant's burden under Justice
Rehnquist's standard, it is clear that a burden of proof would not be placed on
the defendant. At most, the defendant would have a burden of producing
evidence on the question of job-relatedness. In contrast, the Dothard majority
opinion suggests that the burden placed on the defendant in a disparate impact
case is a burden of proof." That is, in order to persuade the Court that the
challenged criterion is legitimate, the defendant must show, not merely assert,
a sufficient relationship between the allegedly discriminatory criterion and the
job for which it is used, or present the business reason which compels its use."
The Dothard majority's statement that the defense is required to show that
the challenged criteria are necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the
business reinforces the rigorousness of its standard. 88 Although the proposition
" Id. at 331.
" Id. at 332.
85 Id, at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist referred specifically to the
McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment opinion to support his standard. Id. See Note, Business
Necessity, supra note 7, at 410-11.
86 433 U.S. at 329.
" The burden of proof guideline is not especially helpful in defining the substance of
the defense in other than testing or credentials cases. Dothard was cited with approval in Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S‘. 136 (1977), .where the Court stated that neutral policies which had a
disparate impact on women might stand if "a company's business necessitates [their] adoption."
Id. at 143. The company's seniority system and its impact on women was the rule challenged in
Satty. Id. at 138. In a footnote, the Court suggested that economic and efficiency interests of the
firm as reflected in efficient job performance may be critical. Id. at 143 n.5. The failure of Nash-
ville Gas Company to enter any proof of business necessity, however, precluded the Court from
engaging in a meaningful exposition of what Would be considered a business necessity. Id. Since
Satty involved neutral rules which were not selection criteria, it is particularly unfortunate that the
Court was denied the opportunity to analyze further the substance of the defense. In Note,
Business Necessity, supra note 7, at 404, 410, the author pointed out that the Court, in business
necessity cases, often has been denied the opportunity to analyze the magnitude of the
defendant's burden because frequently the defendant offers no proof of the need for the chal-
lenged criteria.
433 U.S. at 331 m14.
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did not have a source in prior Supreme Court decisions and, indeed, the Court
cited no case in support of it, it was typical of the formulations found in some
lower federal court opinions. 89 Dothard leads to the conclusion that the Court
was implicitly sanctioning the defense as posited by the lower federal courts, 9 °
while continuing to give a rebuttal opportunity to the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in New York City Transit Authority u.
Beazer, 9 ' however, substantially undermined the rigorousness of the defense in
disparate impact cases. The plaintiffs in Beazer challenged the validity of a
Transit Authority anti-narcotics rule. The rule excluded users of methadone, a
drug used in supervised programs to remove dependence on illicit drugs, from
all jobs in the Transit Authority. 92 Some Transit Authority jobs involved the
safety of the employee or others; 93 other jobs were not safety-critical." Despite
evidence that most methadone users who had been in a methadone program for
one year were free from drug use," the Transit Authority applied its anti-
narcotic rule to exclude all methadone users from all jobs." In 1975, the district
court held this broad application of the anti-narcotics rule to be without ra-
tional basis, and in violation of the equal protection clause." Apparently the
district court thought that it would be constitutional to exclude all methadone
users from some jobs, but not all methadone users from all jobs. 98 One year
later, in awarding attorneys' fees, the district court held that the rule's
disparate impact on blacks and hispanics 99 constituted a violation of Title
VII. '°°
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed on constitutional grounds but did
not analyze the Title VII issue.'° 1 Upon review, the Supreme Court majority
A classic lower federal court formulation of the defense appears in Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971):
Collectively these cases conclusively establish that the applicable test is not merely
whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The
test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the
practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the
business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the
challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to
serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices
which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it
equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.
Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted). See also note 58 supra,
9° See Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7, at 401.
91 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
92 Id. at 571-72, 577.
93 Id. at 571.
" Id.
9' Id. at 575-76, 575 n.9.
96 Id. at 571-72.
97 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
96 Id. at 1058.
99 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
'°° Id. at 278.
'°' 558 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1977). The court of appeals declined to reach the Title
VII issue because it found attorney's fees awardable under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
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criticized the lower court for resolving the constitutional issue prior to the
statutory claim.' 02
 Instead of remanding to the Court of Appeals on the Title
VII issue, however, the Supreme Court proceeded to issue an opinion on the
merits. 1 °3
Initially, the opinion attacked the validity of the statistics found by the
lower court to establish a prima facie case under the disparate impact theory.'"
The Court's dismissal of the Title VII claim, however, did not rest solely on
the weakness of the prima facie case.'° 6
 In a one-sentence conclusion the opin-
ion stated that the application of the anti-narcotics rule to exclude all metha-
done users from all jobs was "job related.'"° 6 Therefore, even if the plaintiff
had made out a prima facie case, a valid defense existed. This conclusion was
supplemented by a short, one-paragraph footnote.'"
The standard applied to excuse the Transit Authority's rule in Beazer is not
as demanding as that in the majority opinion in Dothard; indeed, it is similar to
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Dothard.'°8
 In fact, the Court did not cite
Dothard, its most recent explication of the defense in disparate impact cases. In-
stead, it referred to Griggs and Albemarle for the general "manifest relationship
to the employment in question" formulation of the defense burden found in
those early disparate impact cases.'" The Court's logic, as set forth in a foot-
note, was that (a) the safety goals of the employer require the Transit Authority
to exclude all narcotics users and a majority of methadone users; (b) all
methadone users could be excluded from "safety sensitive" jobs; (c) the safety
goals are served by totally excluding all methadone users from all jobs; (d)
therefore, the rule as applied is manifestly related to the employment in ques-
tion."°
The majority's approach to the standard of the defense in Beazer was at-
tacked by Justice White in dissent.'" For Justice White it was "insufficient"
that the whole rule had "some relationship to the employment" because part of
the rule did not."' Like the majority, the dissent did not cite to Dothard, but
harked back to Griggs and Albemarle. " 3
 The dissent's view was that since the de-
fendant did not show that a "higher quality labor force"" 1 would result from
Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which was passed before the lower court decree became
final. 558 F.2d at 99-100.
102 440 U.S. at 582.
105 Id. at 582-83. The failure of the Court to remand the Title VII issue has been crit-
icized elsewhere. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 51.
104 440 U.S. at 584-87.
105 Id at 587.
"6 Id.
'" Id. at 587 n.31.
1 " See text and note at notes 85-87.
440 U.S. at 587 n.31.
no Id.
"' Id. at 597, 602 (White, J-., dissenting).
112 Id.
" 3 Id.
14 Id.
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the application of the rule, that such quality was necessary, or that "the cost of
making individual decisions ... was prohibitive,"" 8 the defense of job-related-
ness/business necessity had not been established." 6
Contrary to the Beazer majority view, the standard imposed in Griggs a.
Duke Power Co. does not uphold the Transit Authority rule. The problem with
the Beazer interpretation of the defense is that it allows an employer to exclude
all persons with a particular characteristic, or lack thereof, from all jobs
because most of the persons with that characteristic cannot perform some jobs.
Taken to a logical extreme, such a rationale would permit a university to re-
quire a college degree for all university jobs, from full professor to maintenance
crew, on the theory that most or all persons without a college degree could not
perform the job of instructor. If the criterion in question does not have a
disproportionate impact on a protected class, of course, the employer may re-
quire any peculiar thing he wishes of his employees. Prior to Beazer, however, if
the criterion did have a disparate impact, the defendant was required to prove
the existence of a reason which necessitated the criterion." 7 The reason de-
scribed above would have been too broad to have met this standard. The stand-
ard may have excused the exclusion of all persons without a college degree from
any teaching position. Across the board exclusion of all these persons from all
jobs, however, would be at odds with the purpose of Title VII" 8 unless the
defendant could demonstrate some additional explanation for their exclusion.
The requirement of this additional explanation in discriminatory impact cases
was made by cases like Griggs, Albemarle and Dothard, but not dealt with in
Beazer. The departure in the Beazer reasoning from that in Griggs is clear. Griggs
requires the employer to use selection criteria which measure "the person for
the job and not the person in the abstract.'"18 The thrust of Griggs is that in-
dividualized determinations must be made whenever possible. The Beazer
Court abandoned that objective by allowing a rule with a "readily identifiable
and severable" element unrelated to job performance to survive a Title VII
discriminatory impact challenge.m
Arguably, the analysis of the defense in Beazer was not perceived by the
majority as critical to the decision. This would excuse its careless treament.
" 5 Id.
"6 Id.
1'7 See text at notes 113-16 supra.
"8 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. the Court addressed this issue generally:
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general testing
devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed measures of
capability. History is filled with examples of men and women who rendered highly
effective performance without the conventional badges of accomplishment in
terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful servants,
but Congress has mandated the commonsense proposition that they are not to
become masters of reality.
401 U.S. at 433.
119 Id. at 436.
120 440 U.S. at 602 (White, J., dissenting).
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Since in the Court's view the statistical evidence seemed to be insufficient to
establish disparate impact' 21
 the Court's analysis of the "defense" presented
by the Transit Authority was not a necessary element of the decision. The
Court devoted pages to analyzing the weakness of the prima facie case 122 and
only a paragraph to the defense that was presented.'" Its conclusion is most ac-
curately stated as a finding that the plaintiff did not carry the ultimate burden
of persuading the Court that there had been a Title VII violation.' 24 In addi-
tion, the Court viewed the lower court's finding of a Title VII violation as only
an "afterthought" in order to ensure the plaintiff's attorneys' fees.'" This
probably did not dispose the Court to view the Title VII claim hospitably.
Finally, it is possible that the Court believes that the burdens placed on the
Transit Authority to separate acceptable from unacceptable methadone users,
and to monitor those users over the course of their employment, would be
great, and that requiring such individual determinations might compromise
the safe performance of the jobs in question.'" In sum, the substance of the
defense might have been better explained by the Court. The Court's choice not
to do so may imply that this was not the critical aspect of the opinion, and that
its treatment of the defense did not signal the application of a new standard.
In spite of this possibility, Beazer nevertheless suggests a diminution in the
defendant's burden in disparate impact cases. It ignored seemingly inevitable
precedent such as Dothard; it misapplied the standards of the cases that were
cited, such as Griggs; and it relegated the analysis of the defense to a footnote. If
the Court intends to establish a less demanding defense in disparate impact
cases than that posited in Griggs and Dothard, and applied by the lower federal
courts, it should do so explicitly with an explanation for the change. Never-
theless, this diminution of the defendant's burden in Beazer can be read as a
signal to the federal courts hearing disparate impact cases — a signal that
becomes clearer when amplified by the evolution of the defendant's burden in
disparate treatment cases in Supreme Court opinions.
2. The Evolution of the Defendant's Burden in Disparate Treatment Cases —
Implications for Disparate Impact Cases
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green' 27 the Supreme Court stated that the
defendant's burden in a disparate treatment case is to "articulate some legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."' 28
 This descrip-
121 440 U.S. at 584-87.
123 Id.
"3 Id. at 587 & n.31.
1 " Id. at 587 n.31.
123 Id. at 582.
126 For a description of the jobs in question see id. at 571 & n.2. It has been noted that
courts are less demanding of employers when the challenged criteria are alleged to ensure the
public from a safety risk. SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, $ 1.5(d), at 56-57.
127 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
28 Id. at 802.
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tion of the defendant's burden raises two questions. First, how much evidence
must the defendant introduce in order to meet his burden of articulating a non-
discriminatory reason?'" Second, what sort of reason will the court recognize
as a legitimate nondiscriminatory one? The problem of how much the defend-
ant must show to "articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason" vexed
lower federal courts, some of which assumed that the burden placed on the de-
fendant was a burden of proof. 13° The controversy continued until the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. i 37
The implications of the evolutionary course followed by the Court on its way to
Burdine, a disparate treatment case, are crucial, however, for an understanding
of the defense in disparate impact cases.
Two pre-Burdine decisions paved the way for the ultimate resolution of the
quantum of proof controversy. The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Furnco
Construction Company v. Waters, i 32 a disparate treatment case, suggested that the
defendant's burden was "merely that of proving that he based his employment
decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as
race."'" The Court's per curiam opinion the next term in Board of Trustees of
Keene State College v. Sweeney" 4 forebode a clarification of the defendant's burden
that was manifested in the 1981 Burdine decision. In Sweeney, a two-paragraph
opinion remanding the case to the court of appeals,'" the Court stated that the
standard required by Furnco was that of articulating some nondiscriminatory
reason, not proving "the absence of discriminatory motive," which the majori-
ty thought might have been the standard applied by the lower court.' 36 The
123 For an excellent analysis of the ambiguities in evidentiary issues created by the
Supreme Court in disparate treatment cases prior to Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981), see Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV 1129 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mendez].
1° Compare, e.g., Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980)
(burden placed on defendant is burden of proof) with Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,
1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979) (burden placed on defendant is burden of production). See Mendez, supra
note 129, at 1135-39; Friedman, supra note 7, at 4-6. Prior to Burdine, as Professor Mendez
discussed in his article, the plaintiff's prima facie case created a presumption of intentional
discrimination. Mendez, supra note 129, at 1149-50. Although the Court has not expressly used
the term "presumption," the thrust of the opinions strongly suggested that a presumption was
created. Id. The existence of the presumption was made explicit in Burdine. 101 S. Ct. at 1094 &
n.7. The remaining issue was what burden the presumption placed on the defendant. Did it re-
quire the defendant to produce "some evidence[,] . substantial evidence.... [o]r [did it] shift
the burden of persuasion . . .?" Mendez, supra note 110, at 1144. Despite cogent arguments that
the burden of persuasion on the issue of intent should be on the defendant who has better access
to such information, id. at 1157-61, the common view was that the defendant's burden on that
issue is only one of production. Id. 1151-53. The decision in Burdine made clear that the defend-
ant's burden is a burden of production of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his action.
101 S. Ct. at 1094-96.
'$' 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
'" 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
"3 Id. at 577.
134 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
1 " Id. at 25.
"6 Id. at 24-25 & n.l.
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Court suggested that all the employer need do to defend successfully in a
disparate treatment case is provide an "explanation" of his behavior. 137 Re-
quiring the defendant to prove the absence of discriminatory motive, said the
Court, would merge the defendant's burden with the plaintiff's rebuttal
burden.'"
The dissent in Sweeney criticized the majority for reading Furnco as having
changed the standard of defense for disparate treatment cases.'" The dissent
noted that while the defendant's burden in a disparate treatment case is a
burden of production, the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff
throughout."° The dissent was concerned with the manner in which the
defendant met his burden — how could articulation differ from proof?"' The
answer to the question posed by the dissent in Sweeney was resolved, along with
several other points, in the Court's unanimous opinion in Burdine the next
term.
The Burdine decision made explicit several points which were implict in
earlier disparate treatment cases. First, the Court made clear that the
plaintiff's prima facie case creates a presumption of intentional discrimination
by the defendant."' As the Court stated in Furnco and repeated in Burdine, the
plaintiff's case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the con-
sideration of impermissible factors. "143 The term "presumption," however,
had not been used in Furnco. Burdine clearly stated that the "inference" referred
to in Furnco is in fact a rebuttable presumption.'"
The Court also determined that the effect of this presumption of inten-
tional discrimination is to shift the burden of production, not the burden of per-
suasion, to the defendant."' The Court recognized that the burden on the
defendant is identical to that described in the majority and dissent in Sweeney. 146
The burden of production is met if the defendant raises "a genuine issue of
fact" as to whether its action was motivated by discriminatory reasons."' In
the Court's own words, the defendant must produce "admissible evidence
which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment
decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. " 148 This statement
answered the question posed by the dissent in Sweeney as to how the defendant
could meet his burden. The burden is met by producing sufficient evidence to
'" Id. at 25 n.2.
"8 Id. at 24 n.l.
139 Id. at 25-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
io Id. at 29.
"' Id. at 28-29.
142 101 S. Ct. at 1094-95 & n.7.
143 Id. at 1094 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 577).
1 " 101 S. Ct. at 1094-95.
'" Id.
1+6 Id. at 1095.
147 Id. at 1094.
Hu Id. at 1096.
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undercut the presumption of discrimination even without ultimately per-
suading the Court of the absence of any discriminatory motive. In the Court's
view, this burden of production both requires the defendant to meet the plain-
tiff's prima facie case and gives the plaintiff a fair opportunity for rebuttal. 149
The amount or quality of the defendant's evidence must be "evaluated by the
extent to which it fulfills these [two] functions."' 5°
An analysis of the Burdine Court's discussion of the burdens of proof and
production in disparate treatment cases, suggests that the minimal nature of
the defendant's burden is a fair consequence of the ease with which the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case.' 51 Apparently, since little is required to create
the presumption of discrimination, fairness compels that little be required to
overcome the presumption. The rationale behind the Court's description of the
defendant's burden in Burdine raises important implications for disparate im-
pact cases.
Although the Burdine opinion focuses solely on disparate treatment cases,
where intentional discrimination is the "elusive factual question,'"" there is
some reason to expect that its effect will be felt in disparate impact cases as
well. First, although the Burdine Court recognized distinctions between the fac-
tual issues in disparate impact and disparate treatment cases, those distinctions
were described as differences in the "character of the evidence presented."'"
The Court did not analyze how the differences in factual issues between the
two types of cases might relate to the evidentiary burdens placed upon the par-
ties. Nevertheless, the implication in Burdine remains that the nature of the
defendant's burden in a Title VII case is a response to the degree of hardship
imposed upon the plaintiff to establish his prima facie case.'" This principle
may have important ramifications in disparate impact cases.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,' 55 the Court described the plaintiff's burden in
disparate impact cases thus: "[A] plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral
standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory
pattern."'" In Dothard the plaintiff demonstrated the disparate impact of
minimum height and weight restrictions on women by using "generalized na-
tional statistics.'"" The Court accepted such a showing.'" In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., the plaintiff used statewide census figures to demonstrate the dis-
parate impact of a high school diploma requirement on blacks.'" Although
proving disparate impact sometimes may require sophisticated statistical
' 49 Id. at 1095.
150 Id.
Ill Id. at 1094.
'" Id. at 1094 n.8.
"' Id. at 1093 n.5.
134 Id. at 1094.
' 55 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
' 56 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
' 57
 Id. at 329-30 & n.12.
1 " Id. at 330-31.
159 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
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analysis,'" as in Dothard and Griggs, the plaintiff's burden may properly be
described as "not onerous." If it is the non-onerous nature of the plaintiff's
burden in disparate treatment cases that mandates a reduced burden on the
defendant, it seems reasonable to anticipate a parallel diminution of the de-
fendant's burden in cases where the plaintiff need only show disparate impact.
Not only is it logical to expect that the substance of the Burdine defense
may be extended to disparate impact cases, but the Court's reasoning in
Sweeney further supports such an extension. The Sweeney Court reasoned that
proof of the absence of discriminatory motive should not be required of the
defendant since such a requirement would effectively merge the plaintiff's
rebuttal burden into the defendant's burden. 16 ' Since the plaintiff in disparate
impact cases also has a rebuttal burden, which the Court insists must focus on
the defendant's intent,'" the reasoning in Sweeney is equally applicable to such
suits. Thus, the Court may find that a disparate impact defendant's burden
should be downgraded, since imposing a stricter burden may supplant the
plaintiff's rebuttal burden.
In sum, the Court's treatment of the defendant's evidentiary burden in
disparate treatment cases raises important implications for disparate impact
cases as well. If the defendant's burden of proof in disparate treatment cases is
in part a function of the rigorousness of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the
burden of proof imposed on the disparate impact defendant might be expected
to be subjected to the same standard. In addition, since the disparate treatment
plaintiff's burden on rebuttal does not require the defendant to establish the
total absence of discriminatory motive on his part, it seems reasonable to
assume that the disparate impact defendant need not make such a showing
either since intent has been held to be a crucial element of the plaintiff's rebut-
tal in disparate impact cases also. Furthermore, the application of principles
used in disparate treatment cases to disparate impact cases reinforces the
reading of Beazer as marking a diminution in the disparate impact defendant's
burden of proof.
3. Relationship between the Substance of the Defendant's Burden in
Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Cases
The Court's view of the substance of the "legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason" standard is instructive in discerning the relationship between dispar-
ate impact and disparate treatment cases. Although the Burdine opinion stated
1 " Much has been written on this subject. See, e.g., D. BALDUS & R. COLE, STATIS-
TICAL PROOF IN DISCRIMINATION CASES (1980); SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note
52, § 1.8; Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Im-
pact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1977); Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis and
Proof of Employment Discrimination, 1981 UNIV. OF ILL. L. REV. 33.
161 439 U.S. at 24 n.1.
'" See text and notes at notes 37-51 supra.
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that the defendant in a disparate treatment case need only raise a question of
fact concerning the existence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, not
prove its existence,'" the opinion never did define just what constitutes a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Nevertheless, a view of the Court's
definition of a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" may be gleaned from the
contexts in which the standard has been applied in disparate treatment cases.
In McDonnell Douglas, for example, the plaintiff's involvement in criminal ac-
tivity directed at the defendant was found to be a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the defendant's failure to rehire the plaintiff.'" In Furnco, the de-
fendant argued that his desire to hire employees "whose capability had been
demonstrated to defendant's ... superintendent" should overcome the plain-
tiff's case.'°5 Although the Supreme Court did not expressly find that this was a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, it did not reject the possibility that the
court of appeals, on remand, could so deem it.'" The Furnco opinion further
suggested that for a reason to be deemed legitimate, it should be related to the
employer's business goals."' This proposition was bolstered by statements in
McDonnell Douglas that both the defendant and society share the goal of assuring
"efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially
neutral employment and personnel decisions." 168
For the employer's reason to be deemed sufficient to overcome the
presumption against him in a disparate treatment case, then, it must have a
connection with the business goal of securing a competent and trustworthy
work force.' 69 As analyzed earlier, the employer's interest in competent and
trustworthy workmanship also underlies the job-relatedness or business
necessity defense in disparate impact cases.' 7° The point towards which the
defendant should direct his evidence in both disparate treatment and disparate
impact cases is, therefore, the ultimate relationship between the two defenses,
and perhaps a ground for merging them. In fact, the Court in Albemarle, a
disparate impact case, cited the McDonnell Douglas reference to the defendant's
interest in trustworthy workmanship as being relevant to the plaintiff's rebuttal
burden in disparate impact cases. 171
At one level, then, the defenses are similar though they arise in distinct
factual contexts. The defendant in a disparate treatment case must produce
evidence of a legitimate business-related reason which could explain behavior
163 101 S. Ct. at 1096.
164 411 U.S. at 802-03 & n.17.
165 438 U.S. at 574.
"6 It at 578.
167 Id. at 577.
168 411 U.S. at 801.
169 See Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978
Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 Iowa L. REV, 63, 1 02 (1980).
170 See text and notes at notes 57-126 supra.
171 422 U.S. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 801).
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that otherwise appears discriminatory. The defendant in a disparate impact
case must show a job-related need for a rule or criterion which adversely affects
persons protected under Title VII. As noted earlier these reasons are based
upon the business goals of the employer. The major distinction between the
substance of the respective defenses is the degree of clarity with which the
defendant must demonstrate the connection between the business goal and the
challenged practice. As earlier analysis indicated, the defendant's burden in
disparate treatment cases is now to produce evidence that will raise a genuine
issue of fact or doubt on the question of his actual motivation. 12
 In contrast,
the pre-Beazer disparate impact defendant must establish the correlation be-
tween the challenged criteria and job performance. The above analysism sug-
gests that in disparate impact cases, the defendant's burden eventually may be
reduced to a requirement that he produce evidence that will raise a genuine
issue as to the necessity of the challenged practice. 14
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Fume() supports this implication.
In Furnco, the Court accepted without comment the district court's finding that
the prima facie case of disparate treatment was overcome by a demonstration of
business necessity.'" Although an excuse which rises to the level of business
necessity certainly would meet the standards of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason even prior to Burdine, allowing the district court's confusion of defenses
to pass without comment suggests that the Court does not recognize any
distinctions between the defenses, but rather views them as interchangeable.
This view is consistent with Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dothard, a disparate
impact case which described the defendant's burden in language which could
have been extracted from Burdine, 1 76 a disparate treatment case.
Despite its recognition of the theoretical distinctions between disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases,'" the Court has never been forced to ar-
ticulate the importance of these distinctions in terms of the defendant's
burdens. In this context, parroting the lower court's finding of business
necessity in a disparate treatment case suggests a blurring of the distinctions
between disparate impact and disparate treatment defenses. Because proving
172 See text and notes at notes 145-51 supra.
1 " See text and notes at notes 152-71 supra.
174
 Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 339, and the
majority opinion in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587, implied such a
diminution of the defendant's burden. In Dothard justice Rehnquist stated that, in his view, the
defendant's burden is to "advance job-related reasons for the qualification," and described this
burden as met by "offering evidence or by making legal arguments," i. e. , the burden articulated
in Burdine. 433 U.S. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
'" 438 U.S. at 573.
176 Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 329 with Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 1094.
I" See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 1093 n.5; Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United''States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; McDonnell Douglas Corp., v.
Green, 411 U.S. at 806.
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business necessity is more difficult than establishing the absence of discrimina-
tory intent, the inevitable result of a blurring of the distinctions is a diminution
of the substance of the defense in disparate impact cases.
The business necessity defense in Furnco'" was apparently grounded in
the employer's claim that (a) the failure to hire qualified persons would create a
serious problem, as it would for most employers, and (b) using another method
would not assure the hiring of qualified persons.'" Despite the lower court's
acceptance of the defense, it does not seem to meet the standard of business
necessity, since the defendant did not demonstrate that the safe and efficient
operation of the business required this hiring method. Therefore, despite the
lower courts conclusion, it appears that although the defendant had a business
necessity for a qualified work force, he did not prove a business necessity for
the hiring method used to achieve this goal. Since Furnco was a disparate treat-
ment case, the failure to show business necessity was not fatal. However, the
implication in Furnco that the defendant met the burden of showing business
necessity is confusing. This confusion of defenses with the permission by the
Court strongly suggests a dilution of the standards used in determining
business necessity, not a bolstering of those used in determining legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons.
The trend toward reducing the defendant's burden in disparate impact
cases was made clearer in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer. As described
earlier, Beazer allowed the establishment of a defense in a disparate impact case
when the defendant did nothing more than articulate a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason. ISO Application of this standard to disparate impact cases
was anticipated by Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Dothard. "I The defend-
ant in Beazer simply alleged that methadone users would affect the overall quali-
ty of the work force and excluding them from all jobs would obviously
eliminate them from the jobs that they could not perform. 182 As noted earlier,
this allegation, although accepted by the Beazer Court, is not sufficient to
1demonstrate a substantial correlation between job performance for each job in
the Transit Authority and the rule banning all methadone users. In short, it is
not a demonstration of a Griggs or Dothard defense in disparate impact cases.
The relation between the substance of the business necessity defense in
18 In Furnco the district court analyzed whether the defendant's method of hiring
workers either created both a disparate impact on blacks or was the result of disparate treatment
of blacks. 438 U.S. at 569. The district court found that the plaintiffs did not prove either a case
of disparate impact or a case of disparate treatment. Id. Although it is not clear whether the
district court found a prima fade case of disparate treatment, id. at 573, the Supreme Court's
opinion states that even if it had been established it had been overcome by the district court's
finding of a business necessity. Id.
'" Id. at 570-71.
"" See text and notes at notes 106-20 supra.
181 433 U.S. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
182 See text and notes at notes 106-10 supra.
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disparate impact cases and the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason defense in
disparate treatment cases augurs a greater identification of the defendant's
burden in the two cases. The Court has apparently failed to consider the
necessary relationship between the substance of the defenses and the fun-
damental nature of each case — intentional discrimination versus adverse im-
pact without intent. That the Beazer Court did not distinguish the substance of
the defenses in these cases indicates either a lack of care or an intentional
signalling of the ultimate merger of the defendant's responsibilities.
III. CHOOSING A PATH THROUGH THE MAZE —
SEPARATION OR MERGER OF DISPARATE TREATMENT AND
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES
The above analysis strongly suggests that the impetus towards merging
disparate impact and disparate treatment defenses is inevitable. Other com-
mentators have propounded policy reasons that they claim would halt this
development if recognized by the Court.'" There does exist, however, a
relatively simple justification for preserving the distinctions between these
defenses.
The march to merge defendants' burdens in disparate impact and
disparate treatment cases might be halted if the Court were to focus carefully
and explicitly on the nature of the factual issues found in each of these types of
cases. As the Court recognized in Burdine, the factual issues in disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact cases are distinct." 4 In disparate treatment cases,
the ultimate issue of fact is the intent of the defendant.'" The inquiry focuses
on whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to
discriminate against the plaintiff.'" In disparate impact cases the ultimate
issue is whether the challenged criterion has a disproportionate impact on a
protected class which cannot be excused by business necessity.'" Of course,
the Court has injected the intent issue into dispara- te impact cases by way of the
plaintiff's rebuttal.'" Nevertheless, apart from the plaintiff's burden on rebut-
tal, the justification for placing a more substantial burden on the defendant in
disparate impact cases than in disparate treatment cases merits analysis.
As noted earlier, if a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case establishes a
prima facie casem a presumption of intentional discrimination arises.' 90 The
defendant in a disparate treatment case is free, of course, to challenge the
validity of the plaintiff's prima facie case. For example, the defendant might
1 " See, e.g., Note, Business Necessily, supra note 7, at 419-22.
184 101 S. Ct. at 1093 n.5.
185
	
Bhd, of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
"6 Id.
is' Id.
188
 See, e.g., New York City,Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587.
189 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 1094 nn.6 & 7;
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. See text and notes at notes 19-24 supra.
' 9° Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 1094.
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try to establish that the plaintiff was not qualified for the job, thereby
eliminating a crucial element of the prima facie case. Beyond an attempt to
undercut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant's success in a disparate
treatment case rests on the ability to overcome the presumption of intentional
discrimination.'"
In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff uses statistics to show the disparate
effect of the challenged employment practice. 192 The defendant in a disparate
impact case, like his disparate treatment counterpart, may also make a two-
level response to the plaintiff's prima facie case. First, the defendant may at-
tack the statistical evidence by which the discriminatory impact is demon-
strated.' 93 This first level of attack challenges the conclusion of disparate im-
pact that would otherwise be drawn from the plaintiff's prima facie case, just as
the defense in a disparate treatment case attacks the conclusion of intentional
discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son. At the second level, however, the defense of business necessity accepts the
plaintiff's proof of disparate impact but shows that this impact is the result of a
necessary practice. This is a conceptually different approach from that in dis-
parate treatment cases where the defendant only disputes the presumption of
the plaintiff's prima facie case.
The preceding analysis shows that the defense in disparate impact cases
has a distinct genesis from that in disparate treatment cases. Each defense was
designed to effectively undercut distinct prima facie cases. It may be asserted
that, contrary to the suggestion in Burdine, 194 it is the nature of the prima facie
case, not the ease with which the plaintiff may establish it, which should be the
critical aspect in quantifying the defendant's burden. If the defendant's burden
in disparate treatment and disparate impact cases is responsive to the nature of
the plaintiff's case rather than to the difficulty of establishing the plaintiff's
case, the Court's sanctioning of a much less onerous burden for defendants in
disparate treatment cases would not necessarily imply a similar diminution of
the defense in disparate impact cases.
The problem with relying on an explanation grounded in a conceptual
distinction between the defenses based upon the nature of the plaintiff's case is
the Court's apparent failure to see this particular distinction between disparate
impact and disparate treatment cases. Moreover, the Beazer case suggests that
the Court is decreasing the defendant's burden in disparate impact cases in
tandem with its recognition of a less onerous defense burden in disparate treat-
ment cases. There appears to be some validity in this tandem diminution, since
there is a relationship between the two types of cases.
Thus, although the merger of the Court's treatment of disparate impact
and disparate treatment cases may be criticized, several logical similarities ex-
191
In See SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARI)S, supra note 52, §C 1.5(c), 1.8.
193
 Id.,	 1.5(d) at 51-53.
' 94 101 S. Ct. at 1094.
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ist. As noted earlier,'" intent to discriminate should always be relevant in a
Title VII case. Currently, intent to discriminate is a sufficient, but not
necessary, element in proving discrimination under Title VII. Therefore,
although a plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation without proving intent,
a court would always be interested in evidence of the defendant's intent to
discriminate even when intent is not a necessary element of plaintiff's prima
facie case.
It also seems logical that concepts of disparate impact could arise in a
disparate treatment case. For example, consider a case in which a person other-
wise qualified for a job is turned down because he has filed for bankruptcy. The
employer produces evidence of his nondiscriminatory reason — he does not
hire any bankrupts because they create an additional administrative burden.
The "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" explaining his behavior is em-
bodied in a neutral rule. The defendant has produced evidence of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason which may be sufficent to overcome the plaintiff's
prima facie case of disparate treatment. The neutral rule which excuses his
behavior, however, might result in an adverse impact on a protected class, for
example, blacks. This adverse impact is of course the core of a plaintiff's case of
disparate impact.
This analysis suggests that the disparate impact/disparate treatment
dichotomy is more precise in theory than it is in practice. In fact, the disparate
impact cases were decided by the Court against a factual backdrop which sug-
gests disparate treatment. Although Griggs and Albemarle were brought by the
plaintiffs, and decided by the Court, under a disparate impact theory, the facts
in each case contain substantial hints of intentional discrimination. 196 Similar-
ly, in Dothard, the employee's challenge to the "neutral criteria" resulted in the
employer establishing an explicitly discriminatory policy.'" In addition, some
195
 See text and notes at notes 33.34 supra.
196 The Griggs facts have been reviewed in many places, including SULLIVAN, ZIIVIMER
& RICHARDS, supra note 52, 1.5(a), at 33-35, and in Comment, Business Necessity Defense, supra
note 34, at 913-16. Prior to 1965 when Title VII was passed, Duke Power Company, a North
Carolina employer, had overtly discriminated against blacks. In 1965, after Title VII was
passed, the employer instituted requirements which effectively perpetuated the effects of past
discrimination. 401 U.S. at 427-28, 430. Although the court of appeals did not find any intent to
discriminate after the Act was passed, id. at 428, it is logical that ail employer who intended to
discriminate might choose a "neutral" rule to achieve the same result covertly. It would be more
difficult to prove intent in such a case, but certainly the backdrop of explicit discrimination casts a
shadow on the employer's adoption of neutral rules which just happened to have a disparate im-
pact on blacks, thereby accomplishing the same result as the explicitly discriminatory policy.
Similarly in Albemarle, another North Carolina employer stopped segregating jobs on a black-
White basis when Title VII was passed after years of explicit discrimination. 422 U.S. at 426-29.
At that time the employer instituted tests which effectively precluded blacks from jobs they had
failed to achieve earlier due to explicit discrimination. Id.
197
 While the challenge to the neutral height and weight criteria was pending, the
defendant adopted a rule that required corrections personnel in contact positions to be the same
sex as the prisoners. 433 U.S. at 324-25 and n.6. This suggests that the challenged height and
weight rule indeed was intended to exclude women.
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of the Court's disparate treatment cases contained facts which suggest the
potential for disparate impact. This potential was explicit in Furnco' 98 and im-
plicit in McDonnell Douglas. 199
Some commentators have focused on the theoretical distinctions between
disparate impact and disparate treatment cases without recognizing the prac-
tical relationships between them."° A close reading of the cases demonstrates
that despite their premise that intent is not relevant, the Supreme Court has
not applied the disparate impact theory to find discrimination where there has
been no evidence or history of intent to discriminate. 20 ' Arguably, then, the
Court's failure to continue the theoretical separation of disparate impact and
disparate treatment cases is merely part of the evolution of the Court's han-
dling of the Title VII cases. The merger is consistent with the factual contexts
in which the Title VII cases decided by the Court arose.
It is possible that the disparate impact case will merge with the disparate
treatment or intent to discriminate case in the following manner. Recall that
the goal of the plaintiff's initial burden in a disparate treatment case is to create
a presumption that the defendant intended to discriminate against the
plaintiff. 202 The Court, by a slight adjustment in approach, could permit a
presumption of intentional discrimination to be created by showing that a
policy of the defendant has an overwhelmingly disparate impact on a protected
class of which plaintiff is a member. If the challenged rule affected primarily
one minority group, or women, for example, a presumption could be estab-
lished that the defendant instituted the rule to exclude such persons from jobs.
In fact, the Court has sanctioned the use of the disparate impact prima facie
case in class-wide disparate treatment cases by validating the use of statistics in
such cases. 203 For example, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States204 the Court recognized that numbers showing gross disparity in the com-
position of the work force were highly relevant in demonstrating intent to
discriminate. 205 Commentators have argued that impact alone should be
12 ' The district court in Furnco ruled on the plaintiff's challenge to the defendant's hiring
practice on a disparate impact theory as well as a disparate treatment theory. 438 U.S. at 569.
Justice Marshall dissented in Furnco because of the Court's view that plaintiffs were precluded
from pursuing their disparate impact claim on remand. Id. at 583-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In his dissent Justice Marshall emphasized that intent need not be shown in a disparate impact
case and stated that "... nothing in today's opinion ... is inconsistent with this approach." Id.
at 583.
199 411 U.S. at 805 & n.19,
303 See, e.g., Note, Business Necessity, supra note 7; Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal
Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U. OF ILL. L. F., 69, 71-73; B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW chs. 2, 4-6 (1976 & Supp. 1979). But see, e.g.,
SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, 1.4(e); Friedman, supra note 7, at 13-15.
20 ' Sec text and notes at notes 196-97 supra.
292 See text and notes at notes 19-25 supra.
293 See SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, 5 1.4(b) & (c).
204 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
245 Id. at 339 n.20.
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enough to show intentional discrimination, 2°6
 and that on this basis such intent
could have been found in Griggs.'"
Using this approach, once the plaintiff shows disparate impact, he will
have created a presumption of the defendant's intent to discriminate and the
burden then will shift to the defendant to overcome this presumption of
discrimination by evidence sufficient to explain his behavior. If a presumption
of intent to discriminate is established, one could argue that any explanation
that would undercut the presumptive intent should be sufficient to overcome
the plaintiff's prima facie case. There is nothing in Burdine, however, to suggest
that the defendant's burden of production of evidence may be severed from the
employer's interest in trustworthy and efficient workmanship.'" In other
words, in a case involving a rule that excluded from all jobs persons who could
not lift 150 lbs., the defendant still should be required to produce evidence that
the rule served a purpose that was connected with the employer's and society's
interest in trustworthy and efficient workmanship. The presumption should
not be allowed to be overcome by a claim that the defendant did not actually in-
tend to discriminate.'" The employee then should be given the opportunity to
show pretext. In establishing pretext the existence of lesser-impacting alter-
natives, though not controlling, may be useful in showing the employer's in-
tent.
The merger of disparate impact cases into disparate treatment cases will
not work perfectly under current standards, however. Burdine's recognition of
the different factual issues in disparate treatment and disparate impact cases'i°
suggests that the Court will recognize the need for accommodation in develop-
ing standards if the two cases are merged. There will, no doubt, be some fur-
ther evolution and adjustment of the standards as the merger occurs. While the
Court's evolutionary course might be criticized, the Court is not undertaking a
radical or ad hoc departure from the factual realities of its early Title VII opin-
ions. The pressing need is for the Court to recognize explicitly and analyze the
path it is charting.
CONCLUSION
The recent Supreme Court decisions of New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine indicate a diminution
of the defendant's burden of proof in disparate impact cases and a merger of
the defendant's burden in such cases with that of the disparate treatment de-
206 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, 5 1.4(b) at 20-22.
207 It at 21.
"8 On the issue of defendant's interest in trustworthy and efficient workmanship, see
text and notes at notes 163-71, supra; See also SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, at
20.
2" SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 52, 5 1.4(b), at 20.
210 101 S. Ct. at 1093 n.5.
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fendant. An analysis of the orders of proof and the relationships between
substantive defenses in disparate treatment and disparate impact cases suggests
that the nature of these two types of cases justifies a return to separate treat-
ment. Yet their merger seems likely in light of the above-noted Supreme Court
decisions. The Court has developed identical orders of proof, as well as similar
substantive defenses and rebuttal burdens for each type of case. Such a merger
reflects the underlying similarities between the cases and is in some part a func-
tion of the degree to which the cases are intertwined in practice, if not in
theory. It is submitted that the Court should focus on the nature of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, rather than on the ease with which the plaintiff can
establish it, in determining the defendant's burden in both disparate treatment
and disparate impact cases. A merger of this sort would serve to recognize the
inherent differences between the two types of cases while, at the same time, ac-
count for their practical similarities.
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